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課程名稱 |
個體經濟理論二
Microeconomic Theory (Ⅱ) |
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開課學期 |
109-2 |
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授課對象 |
社會科學院 經濟學研究所 |
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授課教師 |
林逸軒 |
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課號 |
ECON8008 |
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課程識別碼 |
323EM0630 |
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班次 |
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學分 |
4.0 |
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全/半年 |
半年 |
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必/選修 |
選修 |
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上課時間 |
星期一7,8,9(14:20~17:20)星期三9,10(16:30~18:20) |
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上課地點 |
社科302社科302 |
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備註 |
本課程以英語授課。三9,10實習課。林逸軒老師教第一部分；班哲明老師教第二部分。先修課：數量方法入門。與班哲明合授
限碩士班以上 或 限博士班
總人數上限：20人 |
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Ceiba 課程網頁 |
http://ceiba.ntu.edu.tw/1092ECON8008_21S |
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課程簡介影片 |
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核心能力關聯 |
核心能力與課程規劃關聯圖 |
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課程大綱
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為確保您我的權利,請尊重智慧財產權及不得非法影印
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課程概述 |
We will study auction and mechanism and repeated games. |
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課程目標 |
Students are expected to gain basic understanding about the most fundamental microeconomic models in which game theory find its major applications. These models are basic building blocks of more complicated economic models. |
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課程要求 |
Students are required to submit homework assignments and to take one exam for each of the two sections. The details are found below or announced in class. |
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預期每週課後學習時數 |
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Office Hours |
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指定閱讀 |
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參考書目 |
Microeconomic Theory by Mas-Colell, Whinston and Green is a classic reference. Advanced Microeconomic Theory by Jehle and Reny and A Course in Microeconomic Theory by Kreps are also graduate-level textbooks. Repeated Games and Reputations: Long-Run Relationships by Mailath and Samuelson is a complete monograph about repeated games. Auction Theory by Krishna is a standard reference in auction and mechanism design. |
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評量方式
(僅供參考) |
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週次 |
日期 |
單元主題 |
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Week 1 |
2/22,2/24 |
General Equilibrium |
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Week 3 |
3/08,3/10 |
General Equilibrium.
Lecture 1 slides are updated. If you have printed out the old version, now you only need to print out pages after 32. |
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Week 4 |
3/15,3/17 |
General Equilibrium under Uncertainty
Lecture 2 slides are updated. If you have printed out the old version, now you only need to print out pages after 31.
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Week 5 |
3/22,3/24 |
Social Choice |
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Week 6 |
3/29,3/31 |
Mechanism Design |
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Week 8 |
4/12,4/14 |
Mechanism Design: Lecture 4 slides are updated |
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Week 10 |
4/26,4/28 |
Repeated games with perfect monitoring |
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Week 11 |
5/03,5/05 |
Repeated games with imperfect monitoring |
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Week 12 |
5/10,5/12 |
Enforceability, self-generation |
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Week 13 |
5/17,5/19 |
Folk theorem, informativeness of the public signal |
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Week 14 |
5/24,5/26 |
Risk sharing, dynamic principal-agent models |
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Week 15 |
5/31,6/02 |
Stochastic games, stationary Markov equilibria |
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Week 16 |
6/07,6/09 |
Applications of stochastic games |
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Week 17 |
6/14,6/16 |
Dragonboat Festival |
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